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Abstract
This paper presents DARX, our framework for building applications that provide adaptive fault tolerance. DARX
relies on the fact that multi-agent platforms constitute a very strong basis for decentralized software that is both
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the computation.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays it barely seems necessary to emphasize the tremendous potential of decentralized software solu-
tions. Their main advantage lies in the distributed nature of information, resources and action. One software
engineering technique for building such software has lately emerged in the artificial intelligence research
field, and appears to be both promising and elegant: distributed agent systems [BDC00] [MCM99] [NS00].
Intuitively, multi-agent systems appear to represent a strong basis for the construction of distributed
applications. The general outline of distributed agent software consists in autonomous computational entities
which interact with one another towards a common goal that is beyond their individual capabilities.
In addition, the multi-agent paradigm bears two attractive notions: flexibility and scalability. By defini-
tion, agents have the ability to adapt in order to meet new context requirements. A software consisting of
multiple agents can therefore be dynamically modified: objectives of specific agents may be altered, new
agents can be brought in to collaborate towards a computation, agents that have become partly useless for the
application can be adapted or set aside, and so on... Moreover, multi-agent systems are based on communi-
cating, autonomous entities; it ensues that there is no theoretical limit to the number of agents involved, nor
is there any bound to the number of hosting machines. Distributing such systems over large scale networks
may therefore tremendously increase their efficiency as well as their capacity.
However, large-scale distribution also brings forward the crucial necessity of applying dependability
protocols. For instance, the greater the number of agents and hosts, the higher the probability that one
of them will be subjected to failure. As mentioned earlier, multi-agent applications rely on the collaboration
amongst agents. It follows that the failure of one of the involved agents might bring the whole computation
to a dead end.
In this paper, we depict DARX, our architecture for fault-tolerant agent computing [MSBG01]. DARX
uses the flexibility of multi-agent systems in order to offer adaptive fault tolerance by means of dynamic
replication mechanisms: software elements can be replicated and unreplicated on the spot and it is possible
to change the ongoing replication strategies on the fly. We have developed a solution to interconnect this
architecture with two existing multi-agent platforms, namely MadKit[GF00] and DIMA [GB99], and in the
long term to other platforms. The originality of our approach lies in two major orientations. Firstly, the
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choice of the fault tolerance protocol – which computational entities are to be made fault-tolerant, to which
degree, and at what point of the execution – is not entirely incumbent upon the application developer; DARX
offers automated observation and control functionalities to address these issues. And secondly, the overall
architecture is conceived with a view to being scalable.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the main existing approaches towards solving the fault
tolerance problems in the multi-agent systems context are presented. Section 3 depicts the general design
of our framework dedicated to bringing adaptive fault tolerance to multi-agent systems through selective
replication. Section 4 reports on the issues raised by the implementation of DARX-compliant applications,
and section 5 evaluates the performances of the resulting software. Finally, the conclusion and perspectives
are drawn in section 6.
2 Related Work
Research on fault tolerance in multi-agent systems mainly focuses on the ability to guarantee the continu-
ity of every agent computation. This approach includes the resolution of consistency problems amongst
agent replicas. However, some solutions also address the complex problems of maintaining agent cooper-
ation [KCL00], providing reliable migration for independent mobile agents and ensuring the exactly-once
property of mobile agent executions [PS01].
Several solutions use specific entities to protect the computational elements of multi-agent systems [H96]
[KIBW99] [KCL00]. The principal contribution of these approaches is in separating the control of the
agents from the functionalities of the multi-agent system.
In [H96], sentinels represent the control structure of the multi-agent system. Each sentinel is specific to a
functionality, handles the different agents which interact to provide the corresponding service, and monitors
communications in order to react to agent failures. Adding sentinels to a multi-agent system seems to be
a good approach, however the sentinels themselves represent bottle-necks as well as failure points for the
system.
A similar architecture is that of the Chameleon project [KIBW99]. Chameleon is an adaptive fault toler-
ance system using reliable mobile agents. The methods and techniques are embodied in a set of specialized
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agents supported by a fault tolerance manager (FTM) and host daemons for handshaking with the FTM via
the agents. Adaptive fault tolerance refers to the ability to dynamically adapt to the evolving fault tolerance
requirements of an application. This is achieved by making the Chameleon infrastructure reconfigurable.
Static reconfiguration guarantees that the components can be reused for assembling different fault tolerance
strategies. Dynamic reconfiguration allows component functionalities to be extended or modified at runtime
by changing component composition, and components to be added to or removed from the system without
taking down other active components. Unfortunately, through its centralized FTM, this architecture suffers
from the same objections as the previous approach.
[KCL00] presents a fault tolerant multi-agent architecture that regroups agents and brokers. Similarly
to [H96], the agents represent the functionality of the multi-agent system and the brokers maintain links
between the agents. [KCL00] proposes to organize the brokers in hierarchical teams and to allow them to
exchange information and assist each other in maintaining the communications between agents. The broker-
age layer thus appears to be both fault-tolerant and scalable. However, the implied overhead is tremendous
and increases with the size of the system. Besides, this approach does not address the recovery of basic
agent failures.
In order to solve the overhead problem, [FD02] proposes to use proxies. This approach tries to make
transparent the use of agent replication; that is, computational entities are all represented in the same way,
disregarding whether they are a single application agent or a group of replicas. The role of a proxy is to act
as an interface between the replicas in a replicate group and the rest of the multi-agent system. It handles
the control of the execution and manages the state of the replicas. To do so, all the external and internal
communications of the group are redirected to the proxy. A proxy failure isn’t crippling for the application
as long as the replicas are still present: a new proxy can be generated. However, if the problem of the single
point of failure is solved, this solution still positions the proxy as a bottle-neck in case replication is used
with a view to increasing the availability of agents. To address this problem, the authors propose to build a
hierarchy of proxies for each group of replicas. They also point out the specific problems which remain to
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Figure 1: DARX application architecture
3 The architecture of the DARX framework
This section presents DARX, our Dynamic Agent Replication eXtension, and depicts its features.
3.1 System model and failure model
A distributed system is assumed, in which processes/agents communicate through messages. Communica-
tion channels are considered to be quasi-reliable. Our model follows that of partial synchrony, proposed by
Chandra and Toueg in their generalization of failure detectors [CT96]. This model stipulates that, for every
execution, there are bounds on process speeds and on message transmission times. However, these bounds
are not known and in our model they hold only after some unknown time: the global stabilization time.
Processes are assumed to be fail/silent. Once a specific process is considered as having crashed, it cannot
participate to the global computation anymore. Byzantine behaviours might be resolved with DARX, but
are not yet integrated in the failure model.
Finally, for scalability issues, a hierarchic structure is imposed for the logical network topology. Sets
of hosts are organized in groups. Broadly connected machines are regrouped in clusters of workstations
(COWs), and a higher inter-COW level is constructed. Within each COW, a single (a set of) host(s) is
elected so as to participate to the higher level.
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3.2 Overview
Figure 1 gives an overview of the logical architecture of DARX.
The fault tolerance features are brought to agents from various platforms through their corresponding
adaptor by an instance of a DARX server running on every location1 . Each DARX server implements the
required replication services, backed by a common global naming/location service enhanced with failure
detection (see 3.3). Concurrently, a scalable observation service (see 3.4) is in charge of monitoring the
system behaviour at each level – local, intra-COW, inter-COW. The information gathered through both
means is used thereafter to adapt the fault tolerance schemes on the fly: periodically, a decision module
combines system-level information and application-level information to determine the criticity2 of each
agent, and to apply the most suitable replication strategy.
DARX includes transparent replication management. While the supported application deals with agents,
DARX handles replication groups. Each of these groups consists in software entities – replicas – which
represent the same agent. Thus in the event of failures, if at least one replica is still up, then the corresponding
agent isn’t lost to the application. A more detailed explanation of a replication group, of its internal design
and of its utilization in DARX can be found in 3.5.
For portability and compatibility issues, DARX is Java-based. Indeed, the Java language and more specif-
ically the JVM provide – relative – hardware independence, an invaluable feature for large-scale distributed
systems. Moreover, a great number of the existing multi-agent platforms are implemented in Java. In addi-
tion to all this, the remote method invocation (RMI) facility offers many useful high-level abstractions for
the elaboration of distributed solutions.
3.3 Failure detection and naming service
As part of the means to supply adequate support for large-scale agent applications, the DARX platform
includes a hierarchical, fault-tolerant naming service. This distributed service is deployed over a failure
1A location is an abstraction of a physical location. It hosts resources and processes, and possesses its own unique identifier.
DARX uses a URL and a port number to identify each location that hosts a DARX server.
2The criticity of a process defines its importance with respect to the rest of the application. Obviously, its value is subjective
and evolves over time. For example, towards the end of a distributed computation, a single agent in charge of federating the results
should have a very high criticity; whereas at the application launch, the criticity of that same agent may have a much lower value.
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detection service based on an adaptable implementation of the unreliable failure detector [BMS02].
The failure detection and naming layer serves a major goal: to maintain dynamic lists of the valid sites
and of the valid agents, as well as their casual replicas, participating to the application. Specific agents can
thus be localized through this service. Failure detectors are organized in groups. They exchange heartbeats
and maintain a list of the processes which are suspected of having crashed. Therefore, in an asynchronous
context, failures can be recovered more efficiently. For instance, the failure of a process can be detected
before the impossibility to establish contact arises within the course of the supported computation – process
A may be suspected of having crashed before a process B fails to contact it for application purposes.
The service aims at detecting both hardware and software failures. Each DARX server integrates an
independent thread which acts as failure detector/name server. Software failure is detected by monitoring
the running processes on each server. Hardware failures are suspected by exchanging heartbeats among
groups of servers. For large-scale integration purposes, this structure comprises two levels: a local and
a global one. Local groups of servers are bound together by a global group. Every local group elects
exactly one representative which will participate to the global group. At the global level, each name server
maintains a list of the known agents within the application – the replication group leaders (see 3.5) in the
DARX context. This information is shared and kept up-to-date through a consensus algorithm implying all
the global name servers. When a new agent is created, it is locally registered as well as by the name server
of the group representative; likewise in the case of an unregistration. At the local level, the naming servers
maintain the list of all the replicas supported in their local group, disregarding whether these are leaders or
not.
In this architecture, the ability to provide different qualities of service to the local and the global detectors
is a major asset of our implementation. Thus on the global level, failure suspicion can be loosened with
respect to the local level. This distinction is important, since a failure does not have the same interpretation
in the local context as in the global one. A local failure corresponds to the crash of an agent or of a host,
whereas in the global context a failure represents the crash of an entire COW.
The naming service makes use of the failure detection to convey its communications. The information
is exchanged between name servers via piggybacking on the failure detection heartbeats. The local lists of
processes which are suspected to be faulty are directly reused to maintain the global view of the application.
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With respect to DARX, this means that the list of running agents is systematically updated. When a DARX
server is considered as having crashed, all the agents it hosted are removed from the list and replaced by
replicas located on other hosts. The election of a new leader within an agent replication group is initiated by
a failure notification from the naming service.
3.4 Observation service
DARX aims at providing decision-making support so as to fine-tune the fault tolerance for each agent with
respect to its evolution and that of its context. Decisions of this type may only be reached through a fairly
good knowledge of the dynamic characteristics of the application and of the environment. In order to obtain
such knowledge, a scalable observation service has been designed and implemented, yet remains to be
integrated in DARX.
Similarly to the naming service, the observation service piggy-backs its communications on the exist-
ing flow created by the regular heartbeat emissions of the failure detection service. Moreover, it is also
hierarchic; it distinguishes local and global levels.
The data collected at the local level consists in instantaneous information such as the current memory load
of a host, the overall execution time of an agent since it was created, the number of messages exchanged be-
tween two agents, . . . This type of data is shared within local groups; broadcasting it or enabling subscription
to it on a large scale does not appear worthwhile. Indeed, the validity of such information over a long period
of time is highly questionable. Besides, its diffusion on a great number of distant locations bears a heavy
cost, even though it would be diluted in the failure detection flow. Nonetheless, it may be needed to gain
instantaneous information on a specific machine outside the local COW. For example, it may be necessary
to determine the feasibility of a replication to a remote COW. The observation service therefore allows for
point-to-point subscription to data collection on distant hosts.
Statistical information, however, possesses a longer lifespan in the DARX context. Such material en-
compasses all the data derived by processing the local information: the average CPU load of a host over a
long period of time, the failure rate of a host or of a local group, their average network load, their meantime
between failures, . . . Hence it is shared at the global level. Every local group elects a member responsible
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for the aggregation of the statistical information, as well as for its diffusion at the global level. Statistical
information about other groups can thus be retrieved at the elected local workstation.
Each local DARX server integrates an observation module. It comprises three elements: a data collection
module (DCM), a data processing module (DPM) and a data exchange module (DEM). The DCM extracts
the information available from the operating system, such as the CPU load or the swap activity, therefore
it is chosen to be host-compliant. The DPM is Java-based and gathers application-level information; the
state of an agent, for example. The DPM also interfaces with the DCM to recover system-level data, and
renders it into a directly usable format for the DARX platform. On a periodic basis, the DEM broadcasts
the accumulated instantaneous information to the DPMs of its local group, and participates to the diffusion
of the statistical information at the global level if it belongs to a leading observation module.
3.5 Replication management
DARX provides fault tolerance through software replication. It is designed in order to adapt the applied
replication strategy on a per-agent basis. This derives from the fundamental assumption that the criticity of
an agent evolves over time; therefore, at any given moment of the computation, all agents do not require to
benefit from the same fault tolerant mechanisms, if any at all. Hence on every server, some agent replicas
will be kept consistent with pessimistic strategies, others with optimistic ones, while some others will not
be replicated at all. The benefit of this scheme is double. Firstly the global cost of deploying fault tolerance
mechanisms is reduced since they are only applied to a subset of the elements which constitute the dis-
tributed application. Secondly the chosen replication strategies ought to be consistent with the computation
requirements and the environment characteristics, as the choice of every strategy depends on the execution
context of the agent to which it is applied. If the subset of agents which are to be replicated is small enough
then the overhead implied by the strategy selection and switching process may be of low significance.
In DARX, agent-dependent fault tolerance is enabled by the notion of replication group (RG): the set of
all the replicas which correspond to a same agent. It follows that a RG contains at least one active replica.
Within the RG, replicas must be kept consistent so as to ensure recovery in case of failures. To allow for
this, several replication strategies are made available by the DARX framework. The strategies offered can
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be classified in two main types: (1) active, where all replicas process the input messages concurrently, and
(2) passive, in which only one replica is in charge of the computation while periodically transmitting its
state to the other replicas.
One of the noticeable aspects of DARX is that several strategies may coexist inside the same RG. As long
as one of the replicas is active, meaning that it executes the associated agent code and participates to the
application communications, there is no restriction on the activity of the other replicas. Indistinctly, those
other replicas may be backups – passive strategy – or followers – semi-active strategy – of the active replica,
or even equally active replicas. Furthermore, it is possible to switch from a strategy to another with respect
to a replica: a follower may become a backup, and so on . . .
Hence a considerable amount of information is necessary to describe a replication group:
  the criticity of its associated agent,
  its replication degree – the number of replicas it contains –,
  the list of these replicas, ordered by potential of leadership3 ,
  the list of the replication strategies applied inside the group,
  the mapping between replicas and strategies.
The sum of these pieces of information constitutes the replication policy of a RG. A replication policy
must be reevaluated in three cases: (1) when a failure inside the RG occurs, (2) when the criticity value of
the associated agent changes, and (3) when the environment characteristics vary considerably, for example
when CPU and network overloads induce a prohibitive cost for consistency maintenance inside the RG. It
seems obvious that all the replicas of a group must have a consistent and up-to-date version of their policy.
However, since the replication policy may be reassessed frequently, it appears reasonable to centralize this
decision process. A leader is elected within the RG for this purpose. Its objective is to adapt the replica-
tion policy to the criticity of the associated agent as a function of the characteristics of its context – the
3The potential of leadership is the capacity of a replica to represent its RG. The strategy used to keep a replica consistent is the
main parameter in the calculation of this potential; the more pessimistic the strategy, the higher its potential. The other parameters
emanate from the observation service; they include the load of the host, the date of creation of the replica, the latency in the
communications with the other replicas of the group, . . .
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information obtained through the observation service. As mentioned earlier, DARX allows for dynamic
modifications of the replication policy. Replicas and strategies can be added to or removed from a group
during the course of the computation, and it is possible to switch from a strategy to another on the fly. For
example, the recovery of a missing active replica may be decided by activating the most suitable backup
inside the RG; or if a backup crashes, a new replication can be initiated to maintain the level of reliability
within the group; or if the criticity of the associated agent decreases, it is possible either to suppress a replica
























Figure 2: Replication management scheme
Figure 2 depicts the composition of a replica. In order to benefit from fault tolerance abilities, each agent
gets to inherit the functionalities of a DarxTask object, enabling DARX to control the agent execution.
Each task is itself wrapped into a TaskShell, which handles the agent inputs/outputs. Hence DARX
can act as an intermediary for the agent, committed to deciding when an agent replica should really be
started, stopped, suspended or resumed, and exactly when and which message receptions should take effect.
Leaders are wrapped in enhanced shells, comprising an additional ReplicationManager. This manager
exchanges information with the observation module (see 3.4) and performs the periodical reassessment of
the replication policy. It also maintains the group consistency by sending the relevant information to the
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other replicas, following the policy requirements.
Communication between agents passes through proxies implemented by the RemoteTask interface.
These proxies reference replication groups; it is the naming service which keeps track of every replica to be
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Figure 3: A simple agent application example
Figure 3 shows a tiny agent application as seen in the DARX context. An emitter, agent B, sends messages
to be processed by a receiver, agent A. At the moment of the represented snapshot, the value of the criticity
of agent B is minimal; therefore the RG which represents it contains a single active replica only. The
momentary value of the criticity of agent A, however, is higher. The corresponding RG comprises three
replicas: (1) an active replica A elected as the leader, (2) a follower A’ to which incoming messages are
forwarded, and (3) a backup A” which receives periodical state updates from A.
In order to transmit messages to A, B requested the relevant RemoteTaskRTA from the naming service.
Since replication group A contains only one active replica, RTA references replica A and no other.
If A happens to fail, the failure detection service will ultimately monitor this event and notify A’ and A”
by means of the localization service. Both replicas will then modify their replication policies accordingly.
The replica associated to the highest potential of leadership will then become the new group leader – most
probably A’ in this case as semi-active replication provides stronger consistency than passive replication –,
hence ending the recovery process.
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4 Application building with DARX
This section describes how a multi-agent application may be built over DARX, and hence benefit from its
fault tolerance features.
Analysis of the original agent source code might provide the required information to enable DARX sup-
port without further modifications of the original program [BGCAMS02]. However, at this point of our
research, the application developer must respect a few guidelines and constraints which are given thereafter.
As a Java framework, DARX includes several generic classes which assist the developer through the pro-
cess of implementing a reliable multi-agent application. The choice of those generic classes comes from the
study of the OMG MASIF [MASIF98] specifications, as well as that of the most recurrent aspects of various
MAS, therefore DARX-compliant application building is very close to most agent developing environments.
Every agent class must extend a DarxTask for several reasons. Although it is not the only factor, the
state of an agent is essential in determining its criticity. Any number of states can be defined for the agent;
each of those states ought to be mapped to a corresponding static criticity in the code of the Replica-
tionManager. A static criticity is the importance of an agent taken out of its computation context. At
runtime, a dynamic criticity will be evaluated in conjunction with the characteristics of the environment.
Also, the DarxTask provides a boolean for differentiating whether the replica is active or not: indeed,
some methods may deviate in each case. For example, in non-deterministic programs some state switches
should be initiated by a single active replica only. In consequence, the number of active replicas inside a RG
depends upon the strategies applied as much as upon the code of the agent itself. Finally, the DarxTask
is the point where DARX handles the execution of an agent: application-specific control methods to start,
stop, suspend and resume the agent have to be defined for this purpose. Such methods would be very hard
to implement in a general context, where the application developer would not have to intervene, without
modifying the JVM and the efficiency loss would be drastic. Technically, it is the DarxTaskwhich is sent
as a state
Since DARX overrides the localization and naming services of the agent platforms it supports, com-
munications between agents must be taken care of. Communicating agents must instantiate a DarxCom-
municationInterface; messages to other agents are emitted through this interface, built around the
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RemoteTask reference of the destinations. Messages sent to a group by means of a RemoteTask are
thus rerouted to the group leaders, where duplicates are discarded and ordering is guaranteed. Additionally,
this scheme allows tracking of the message flows by the observation service.
Also, fault tolerance protocols that are specific to the application can be developed. DARX provides a
generic ReplicationStrategy class which may be extended to fulfill the needs of the programmer.
Basic methods allow to define the consistency information within the group, as well as the way this informa-
tion ought to be propagated in different cases, such as synchronous or asynchronous messages for example.
A few common strategies, such as the passive and the semi-active one, are already built in DARX; others
are undergoing research, like quorum-based strategies for instance.
5 Performances
This section presents performance evaluations established with DARX. Measures were obtained using JRE
1.4.1 on the Distributed ASCI Supercomputer 2 (DAS-2). DAS-2 is a wide-area distributed computer of 200
Dual Pentium-III nodes. The machine is built out of clusters of workstations, which are interconnected by
SurfNet, the Dutch university Internet backbone for wide-area communication, whereas Myrinet, a popular
multi-Gigabit LAN, is used for local communication.
5.1 Agent-oriented dining philosophers example
A first experiment aims at checking that there is indeed something to be gained out of adaptive fault toler-
ance. For this purpose, an agent-oriented version of the classic dining philosophers problem [H85] has been
implemented over DARX.
In this application, the table as well as the philosophers are agents; the corresponding classes inherit from
DarxTask. The table agent is unique and runs on a specific machine, whereas the philosopher agents
are launched on several distinct hosts. Figure 4 represents the different states in which philosopher agents









Figure 4: Dining philosophers over DARX: state diagram
  Thinking: the agent processes data which isn’t relevant to the rest of the application,
  Hungry: the agent has notified the rest of the application that it requires resources, and is waiting for
their availability in order to resume its computation,
  Eating: data which will be useful for the application is being treated and the agent monopolizes global
resources – symbolized by the chop-sticks.
In order to switch states, a philosopher sends a request to the table. The table, in charge of the global
resources, processes the requests concurrently in order to send a reply. Depending on the reply it receives,
a philosopher may or may not switch states; the content of the reply as well as the current state determine
which state will be next. It is arguable that this architecture may be problematic in a distributed context. For
a great number of philosophers, the table will become a bottleneck and the application performances will
degrade consequently. Nevertheless, the goal of this experimentation is to compare the benefits of adaptive
fault tolerance with respect to fixed strategies. It seems unlikely that this comparison would suffer from such
a design. Besides, the experimentation protocol was built with these considerations in mind.
Since the table is the most important element of the application, the associated RG policy is pessimistic
– a leader and a semi-active follower – and remains constant throughout the computation. The RGs corre-
sponding to philosophers, however, have adaptive policies which depend on their states. Table 1 shows the
mapping between the state of a philosopher agent and the replication policy in use within the corresponding
RG.
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Agent state Replication degree Replication policy
Thinking 1 Single active leader
Hungry 2 Active leader replicated passively
Eating 2 Active leader replicated semi-actively
Table 1: Dining philosophers over DARX: replication policies
5.2 Results analysis
The experimentation protocol is the following. Eight of the DAS-2 nodes have been reserved, with one
DARX server hosted on every node. The leading table replica and its follower each run on their own server.
In order to determine where each philosopher leader is launched, a round robin strategy is used on the six
remaining servers. The measure can start once all the philosophers have been launched and registered at the
table.
Two values are being measured. The first is the total execution time: the time it takes to consume a fixed
number of meals (100) over all the application. The second is the total processing time: the time spent
processing data by all the active replicas of the application. Although the number of meals is fixed, the
number of philosophers isn’t: it varies from two to fifty. Also, the adaptive – “switch” – fault tolerance
protocol is compared to two others. In the first one the philosophers are not replicated at all, whereas in the
second one the philosophers are replicated semi-actively with a replication degree of two – one leader and
one follower in every RG.
Every experiment with the same parameter values is run six times in a row. Executions where failures have
occurred are discarded since the protocol without replication does not always enable to end the application.
The results shown here are the averages of the resulting measures.
Figure 5(a) shows the total execution times obtained. At first glance it demonstrates that adaptive fault
tolerance may benefit to distributed agent applications in terms of performances. Indeed the results are
quite close to those obtained with no fault tolerance involved, and are globally much better than those of
the semi-active version. In the experiments with two philosophers only, the cost of adapting the replication
policy is prohibitive indeed. But this expense becomes minor when the number of philosophers – and hence



















































(a) Comparison of the total execution times (b) Comparison of the total processing times
Figure 5: Performance comparison with various fault tolerance protocols
experiments with the unreplicated version of the application: with six philosophers there is exactly one
replica per server, so each processor is dedicated to its execution. In the case of the semi-active replication
protocol, the cost of the communications within every RG, as well as the increasing processor loads, explain
the poor performances.
It is important to note that, in the case where the strategies inside RGs are switched, failures will not
forbid the termination of the application. As long as there is at least one philosopher to keep consuming
meals, the application will finish without deadlock. Besides it is possible to simply restart philosophers
which weren’t replicated, since these replicas had no impact on the rest of the application: no chop-sticks
in use, no request for chop-sticks recorded. This is not true in the unreplicated version of the application as
failures that occur while chop-sticks are in use will have an impact on the rest of the computation.
Figure 5(b) accounts for the measured values of the total processing time in each situation. Those results
also concur to show that adaptive fault tolerance is a valuable protocol. Of course, the measured times are
not as good as in the unreplicated version. But in comparison, the semi-active version induces a lot more
processor activity. It ought to be reminded that in this particular application, the switch version is as reliable
as the semi-active version in terms of raw fault tolerance: the computation will end correctly. However, the
semi-active version obviously implies that the average recovery delays will be much shorter in the event


















Figure 6: Strategy switching cost as a function of the replication degree
the recovery delay depends on the strategy in use: unreplicated philosophers will have to be restarted from
scratch and passive backups will have to be activated before taking over.
5.3 Replication policy switching
Finally, we evaluate the times required to switch replication strategies: Figure 6 shows the times measured
when changing, at different replication degrees, from an active strategy to a passive one, and vice versa. As
expected, in the former case, the costs are very low as nothing much has to be performed except the strategy
modification. Whereas in the latter case, each replica has to be updated in order to enable the change: a time-
expensive operation even though the replicated task carries little overload – 100 kilobytes. This evaluation
shows that the cost of strategy switching can be significant. Yet this significance ought to be avoided by a
careful application of DARX mechanisms.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
The framework presented in this paper enables the building of fault-tolerant distributed multi-agent systems.
The resulting software is flexible: it possesses the ability to decide which parts of the computation are
more critical than the others, and hence should be made to bypass failures through replication. DARX
offers control over the way the application safeguards its components, enabling the fault tolerance of the
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computation to be automatically fine-tuned on the fly. This feature proves to be quite powerful: it allows
adaptive fault tolerance whilst preserving software efficiency, as demonstrated by the performances shown
in this paper. Moreover, the architecture of the middleware is designed to be scalable.
However, there are still some issues left unsolved: for instance, the observation service mentioned in
section 3.4 remains to be integrated in the framework. It works as a stand-alone application, and the API
for exchanging commands and data with DARX is set. But the modifications of the DARX classes which
shall make use of the observation service are being coded, and the dynamic usage of the observation data
is still research material. Hence the current field of investigation is the analysis of the dynamic criticity of
agents and the adaptation of the replication policy. The heuristics used up to now are mainly driven by the
user, due to the lack of a functional observation system. Once it is fully integrated in DARX, that is once
confronted to the real characteristics of the hosts and of the network, those heuristics will be enhanced for
further efficiency and adequateness. Undergoing study is the possibility to use OpenSSH in order to ensure
secure communications between agents, and also within replication groups.
In order to validate the work achieved up until now, applications are currently being developed. Those
include a basic crisis management system destined to test the viability and the utility of our architecture in
terms of such software.
References
[BDC00] H. Boukachour, C. Duvallet and A. Cardon, “Multiagent systems to prevent technological risks”
In Proceedings of IEA/AIE’2000, Springer Verlag 2000.
[BGCAMS02] J.-P. Briot, Z. Guessoum, S. Charpentier, S. Aknine, O. Marin and P. Sens “Dynamic Adap-
tation of Replication Strategies for Reliable Agents” In Proc. 2nd Symposium on Adaptive Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-2), London, UK, April 2002.
[BMS02] M. Bertier, O. Marin and P. Sens, “Implementation and performance evaluation of an adaptable
failure detector” In Proc. of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks,
Washington, DC, USA, 2002.
[CT96] T. D. Chandra and S. Toueg “Unreliable Failure Detectors for Reliable Distributed Systems” In
Journal of the ACM, 43:2, March 1996, pp. 225-267.
[FD02] A. Fedoruk and R. Deters, “Improving Fault-Tolerance by Replicating Agents”, In Proceedings of
1st International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Bologna, Italy,
July 2002.
19
[GB99] Z. Guessoum and J.-P. Briot, “From active objects to autonomous agents” In Special Series on
Actors and Agents, edited by Dennis Kafura and Jean-Pierre Briot, IEEE Concurrency, 7(3):68-76,
July-September 1999.
[GF00] O. Gutknecht and J.Ferber, “The MadKit agent platform architecture”, In 1st Workshop on Infras-
tructure for Scalable Multi-Agent Systems, Barcelona, Spain, June 2000.
[GS97] R. Guerraoui and A. Schiper, “Software-Based Replication For Fault Tolerance” In IEEE Computer,
30(4):68-74, 1997.
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